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A simpler way to understand the results of risk assessment instruments 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An eminent surgeon at a conference on evidence-based practice confessed: 
I myself chose to be trained as a surgeon in order to avoid two things: statistics 
and psychology.  Now I realize they are both indispensable (Gigerenzer, 
20002, p.94). 
While his hostility to psychology would be unusual in child protection work, his 
desire to avoid statistics will strike a chord with many.  Once we have left school, we 
may have little to do with numbers and, for many, there is heart-felt relief that this is 
so.  Unfortunately, numeracy is becoming a crucial skill.  Professionals using an 
evidence-based approach need to be able to understand statistics and how to apply 
them to a particular client or family.  Risk assessment instruments, which are 
becomingly increasingly common, pose a particular mathematical issue: if this family 
is assessed as at high risk of abuse, how likely is this result to be accurate?  
 
Without specific training, people given the necessary figures about an instrument’s 
reliability find it surprisingly hard to work out the correct answer.  Research shows a 
high level of misunderstanding among medical practitioners, with a persistent bias 
towards grossly over-estimating the accuracy of results (Casscells et al, 1978; 
Gigerenzer, 2002).   These mistakes can have devastating effects on patient care.  A 
similar level of ignorance in child protection work could have an equally damaging 
impact on children and parents as these instruments are more widely used in daily 
practice. 
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Psychologists have repeatedly shown that people have a particularly poor ability to 
reason intuitively about probabilities.  Many have taken these findings as evidence of 
the frailty of the human intellect and its vulnerability to cognitive illusions and biases 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). However, research at the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development in Germany has found that people’s reasoning is significantly 
affected by the way the information is presented and that, given the right methods, 
their intuitive grasp of probabilities can be significantly improved (Gigerenzer and 
Selten, 2001). This article will show how these lessons can be applied to dealing with 
the key probability calculations in judging the reliability of a risk assessment 
instrument. 
 
 
The power of a diagnostic instrument 
 
 
Professionals need to know how accurate a result is because it should effect how they 
use it in working with a family.  If they know, for instance, that most positive results 
are, in fact, false positives, then they should treat a specific result as, at best, a 
tentative hypothesis to be tested further.  Equally, if a family is assessed as low risk 
using an instrument where a lot of the negatives will be false, then, again, 
professionals should stay alert to the possibility that this benign assessment may be 
wrong. 
 
Practitioners face two obstacles in working out the reliability of a risk assessment 
instrument, or any other diagnostic procedure.  First, the authors of the instrument 
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rarely inform the reader of all the statistics needed to evaluate its accuracy.  Secondly, 
when they do present statistics, they usually do it in a way that is hard for the average 
person to understand. 
 
To evaluate accuracy, we need to know the values of three variables: 
 
(1) The sensitivity of the instrument: how many high risk families it will 
identify accurately (the percentage of true positives); 
(2) The specificity: how many low risk families it will identify accurately 
(percentage of true negatives); 
(3) The base rate or prevalence of the phenomenon (in this case, abuse) 
being measured. 
 
Each of these three variables play a distinctive part in working out the overall 
usefulness of an instrument but it is the final one – the base rate – that is most often 
overlooked or misunderstood.  Put briefly, the rarer the phenomenon being assessed, 
the harder it is to develop an instrument with a clinically useful level of accuracy.  
Conversely, the higher the prevalence, the easier it is.  Hence, researchers face a 
harder task trying to develop a risk assessment instrument to screen the general 
population, where the incidence of abuse is relatively low, than if their target 
population were specifically families known to child protection agencies, where the 
base rate will be much higher. 
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When the full set of relevant figures for an instrument are provided, they are 
usually presented in a way that is hard for anyone to follow intuitively.  (This 
criticism applies also to my own work e.g. Munro, 2002).  
 
This is the way the calculation is usually presented: 
 
The probability of a family being abusive is 20%.  If a family is abusive, the 
probability of being identified by the instrument is 90%.  If the family is not 
abusive, the probability that they will be correctly identified is 80%.  In a case 
where the instrument produces a positive result, what is the probability that it 
is a true positive? 
 
Extensive research among medical practitioners has consistently found a high error 
rate in answering this type of question.  The vast majority of respondents gave a reply 
between 70 and 90%, which, as you will see, is a gross over-estimate of the 
probability (Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998).    
 
Intuitive efforts to deal with problems like this are clearly very defective.  We can get 
a more accurate answer by using formal probability theory but the following section 
will probably seem even more daunting for most child protection workers. The 
answer can be calculated by using Bayes Theorem: 
 
Figure 1 
In formal terms, where p(a/t) means the probability of a positive result being a true 
positive: 
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Figure 2 
 
Readers with some statistical background will be able to follow this formula but the 
chances are that they will be few in number.  However, if we present the same 
information in terms of frequencies, it becomes much easier to understand and people 
are much more successful in working out the answer without using a formal theorem: 
 
Twenty out of every 100 families in this population are abusive (the base rate).  
Of these 20 families, 18 will get a positive result on using the instrument (the 
sensitivity). Of the other 80 families, some 16 will also get a positive result 
(the specificity). Imagine the instrument has given a positive result for a group 
of families.  How many of these families with a positive result will actually be 
abusive? 
 
The calculation can be made even clearer by using a tree diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tree diagram 1 
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It is easy to work out that 34 families will get a positive result, of which 18 will be 
true positives.  Thus the probability of a positive result being a true positive = 
 
 18    = 0.53. 
       18 + 16               
 
The crux of the problem is that people forget, or do not know, the importance of the 
base rate in determining the level of false positives. This was shown in a famous 
study:  the Harvard Medical School Test  (Casscells et al, 1978).  Staff and students at 
Harvard Medical School were told of a diagnostic test that had a high specificity of 
95% and a superb sensitivity of 100% (no-one who had the disease would test 
negative).  They were asked the probability of someone who tested positive actually 
having the disease.  As the reader of this article will now know, they cannot answer 
this question without the additional information about the prevalence of the specific 
disease being tested for.  However, few respondents realised this and the majority said 
the probability was 0.95 – the rate of true positives. 
 
HIV tests provide a particularly vivid and tragic illustration of the consequences of 
this level of professional ignorance about how to interpret test results.  Getting a 
positive HIV result is so serious that it is crucial to know how many are true and how 
many are false positives.  Yet studies of doctors’ and counsellors’ knowledge reveal 
that they have similar difficulties to the staff and students at the Harvard Medical 
School and many are giving patients misleading advice (Gigerenzer, 2002, p.127). 
 
HIV testing typically involves an initial ELISA test designed to detect antibodies 
against HIV in blood samples.  If the result is negative then the patient is notified that 
he or she is HIV-negative.  If it is positive, then at least one more ELISA test is done 
 7
and, if this is also positive, a Western blot test is performed.  If this is positive then 
the patient is told that he or she is HIV-positive.  This very thorough sequence of tests 
produces high sensitivity (99.9%) and specificity rates (99.99%).  Unfortunately, most 
doctors and counsellors involved in the testing tell patients with a positive result that 
the probability of a false positive is so low that it can be discounted.  However, this is 
not necessarily true, depending on what group the patient belongs to. The base rates in 
the following account, taken from Gigerenzer (2002), are based on German statistics. 
 
If the patient comes from the high-risk group of homosexual men, then the base rate 
of infection is 1.5%.   Therefore the calculation is: 
 
Take a group of 10,000 homosexual men.  We expect 150 to be infected with 
the virus, and most likely all of them will test positive (sensitivity).  Of the 
9,850 men who are not infected, we expect that 1 will test positive 
(specificity).  Thus, we have 151 men who test positive, of who 150 have the 
virus.  A patient’s chances of not having the virus, given a positive result, are 
1 out of 151, that is, less than 1%. 
 
Tree diagram 2 
 
However, if the patient is from a low risk group, with none of the known risk factors 
applying, then the conclusion is very different.  For this group, the base rate was 
0.01% - one in 10,000: 
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Take a group of 10,000 men who are not in any known risk category.  We 
would expect 1 to be infected and he will test positive with practical certainty. 
Of the 9,999 men who are not infected, we expect that another one will also 
test positive. Thus, we have 2 men with positive results, only one of whom is 
infected.  If a patient has a positive result, his chances of not having the virus 
are 50/50. 
 
Tree diagram 3 
 
Gigerenzer (2002, p.127) reports that one of his students volunteered to check what 
information was given to patients before being tested for HIV.  He visited twenty 
public health centres in Germany, presenting himself as someone who had no known 
risk factors for HIV, and had  pre-test counselling.  This is mandatory in Germany and 
staff are responsible for explaining the reliability of the result before the test is 
performed.  The student specifically asked what were the chances of men in his risk 
group (very low risk) actually having HIV given a positive result.  Ten counsellors 
told him it was absolutely certain that it was a true positive.  Five said it was 99.9% 
certain.  Two avoided answering his questions and three gave estimates above 90 but 
below 99.9%.  None gave anything like the correct answer of 50%. 
 
Implications in child protection work 
 
Increasingly, child protection agencies are adopting risk assessment instruments 
(Wald and Woolverton, 1990; Lyons et al, 1996; Baird et al, 1999).  They may be 
used at several different stages. Some are designed to screen the general population to 
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identify potentially abusive parents so that preventive measures can be offered. Some 
help agency staff decide how to respond to an initial allegation of abuse, i.e. how 
seriously and urgently the referral is dealt with (Johnson and Clancy, 1988; Wells and 
Anderson, 1992; Zuravin et al, 1995).  Others assess which of the families already 
known to the agency are high or low risk and the findings inform the allocation of 
resources or other aspects of the management of the case (Lyons et al, 1996).  
 
The existing literature on risk assessment instruments does not give sufficient 
information to let the reader work out the accuracy of an instrument.  Some merely 
give a single statistic on accuracy, saying, for instance, an instrument has a 65% 
degree of accuracy (e.g. Johnson, 1996).  Others provide more detail and tell the 
reader the sensitivity and the specificity (Lyons, et al, 1996).  However, information 
about the base rate is usually missing.  Yet, as the earlier discussion showed, base 
rates are a crucial part of working out how reliable any result is.  How big a difference 
they can make was seen in the HIV example but let me also illustrate it in child 
protection work.  Because of the difficulties of getting accurate statistics on the 
incidence of abuse, I have made an educated estimate of base rates in the following 
examples.  
 
Zuravin et al (1995) report an instrument for screening initial referrals – deciding 
whether or not they warrant further investigation - with a sensitivity of 69% and a 
specificity of 74%.  Besharov (1990) estimates that the number of referrals that are 
substantiated as cases of abuse is between 35 and 45%.  Taking the average, let us 
assume a base rate of 40% and calculate the probability that a positive result on this 
instrument will be a true positive. 
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In a group of 1,000 families, we would expect that 400 would be abusive.  Of 
these 400 families, 276 will get a positive result on using the instrument 
(sensitivity 69%).  Of the other 600 families, 156 will also get a positive result 
(specificity 74%).  Therefore, there will be a total of 432 positive results, of 
which 276 will be true positives. 
Tree  diagram 4 
 
The probability of a positive result being a true positive = 
 
            276     =  0.64 
       276+156 
 
Let us now consider how an instrument with the same sensitivity and specificity 
would perform if used on a sample with a much lower base rate – say, as a screening 
of the general population.  Corby (1993, p.53), using the numbers of children on child 
protection registers in England, estimated a prevalence of 4 per thousand, 0.4%. 
 
If we take a group of 1,000 families, we expect that 4 will be abusive.  Of 
these 4 families, 3 approximately will get a positive result on using the 
instrument (sensitivity 69%).  Of the other 996 families, 259 will also get a 
positive result (specificity 74%).  Therefore, there will be a total of 262 
positive results, of which 3 will be true positives. 
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Tree diagram 5 
 
The probability of a positive result being a true positive = 
 
                  3     =  0.12  
    3+259 
 
In both cases, the accuracy is far lower than most people expect intuitively from being 
told just the sensitivity and specificity and it has serious practice implications.  If we 
are screening the general population, an instrument with this degree of reliability 
would identify a very large group of families as potentially abusive, but only a tiny 
percentage would be true positives.  Therefore, if an agency used such an instrument 
as the basis for providing preventive services, it would need generous resources to 
meet the identified need.  At the same time, it would have to recognise that about a 
quarter of dangerous families were being overlooked.   
 
In screening initial referrals, the probability of a positive result being accurate is 
considerably higher (0.64) but this is still far below certainty.  This has implications 
for how professionals should use it. If it is mistakenly taken as highly reliable, then it 
will affect how professionals work with a family, what information they seek, and 
how they interpret it. There is overwhelming evidence from psychology that, once 
people have formed a judgement about a person or family, they are slow to change 
their minds.  They tend to be selective in what they notice and in how they interpret 
new information to fit with their existing judgement  (Kahneman et al, 1990).  
Therefore, professionals who put too much trust in the result of an instrument will be 
biased towards confirming it, paying attention to the evidence, for example, that 
supports the claim that the family is high risk and being slow to see the significance of 
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counter evidence.  Conversely, if they conclude firmly that a family is low risk, they 
will be biased against new evidence that should cause concern.  Many of the deaths of 
children known to child protection agencies have arisen in circumstances where those 
in close contact with the parents had decided that all was going well and were blind to 
evidence that, with hindsight, looks overwhelming (Munro, 1999).  
 
A critical mindset is needed in using the results of risk assessment instruments. 
Whatever judgement is made about the level of risk to a child, professionals need to 
remember this is a hypothesis, not a certain truth, and to keep it under constant, 
critical review.   The individual professional, however, needs to work in an agency 
culture that allows and encourages this approach.  Supervisors play a key role in 
helping front line workers stand back to reflect on and critique their reasoning.  
Unfortunately, access to good casework supervision is becoming scarce (Rushton and 
Nathan, 1996).  Managers’ priority can be to supervise the administrative process, 
ensuring that all legal and procedural rules have been followed.   
 
This is, in part, due to the rise of defensive practice.  In both USA and the UK, the 
public and media have played a large part in shaping child protection priorities.  
Outrage at children’s deaths at the hands of their carers has been directed at the 
professionals, especially the social workers, who have the duty of protecting children 
(Waldfogel, 1998; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam, 1997).  This pressure has led agencies 
to increase the level of investigations to minimise the chances that a child will 
mistakenly be left in danger.  However, in an area with such imperfect knowledge, 
our ability to predict which parents will seriously harm their children is extremely 
limited.  The public desire for safety cannot be met.   
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Agencies, realising that the risk of child deaths cannot be wholly removed, may take 
steps to protect themselves. They may try to transfer or dissipate blame by engaging 
in ‘blame prevention re-engineering’ (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2000).  Hood et 
al’s research found that one strategy for doing this is ‘protocolozation’: the 
organisation introduces more and more formal procedures to guide practice so that 
they create a ‘correct’ way to deal with a case. Then, if a tragedy occurs, they can 
claim the defence of ‘due diligence’ and show that their employees followed these 
correct procedures in working on the case.  A child may have died but the agency 
staff can show a clear audit trail of what they did and cannot be faulted for the tragic 
outcome.  This defence certainly seems to be operating in the UK where recent 
inquiries into the deaths of children known to child protection agencies appear to 
focus more on whether procedures were followed than whether competent 
professional judgements and decisions were made (Cambridgeshire County Council, 
1997; Norfolk Health Authority, 2002). 
 
Unfortunately, if such a defensive culture exists, it is in the agency’s interests to act as 
if the results of a formal assessment instrument are certain.  They provide a clear basis 
for management of the case and removes problems associated with individual 
professional competence.  There is a ‘right’ way to respond which can be proven to 
anyone investigating the agency.  In a defensive culture, the protection of the agency 
can start to dominate over the protection of children.   
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Conclusion 
 
In the past, professionals generally relied upon their own expert judgement in judging 
the level of risk but child protection agencies are increasingly introducing risk 
assessment instruments to inform and support decisions about service response.  Some 
way of categorising cases into high risk and low risk groups is necessary.   Intruding 
into the privacy of the family can only be justified in a liberal society by serious 
concern for the rights and welfare of the child.  Also, agency resources are limited and 
all families cannot be offered a service even if they wanted to receive help.     
 
Introducing formal instruments as an aid has many advantages.  There is evidence that 
it leads to a more consistent and, so, more equitable response (Baird et al, 1999).  It is 
also likely that actuarial instruments that use formal statistics to compute the answer 
are more accurate than clinical judgement.  There is little evidence on this specifically 
in relation to child protection but all the evidence from other fields where comparison 
has been made between actuarial and clinical judgement is strongly weighted in 
favour of actuarial (Grove and Meehl, 1996).  This should not surprise us since people 
generally have difficulty in working out probability calculations and these instruments 
produce a large set of data to weigh.  Paul Meehl, the psychologist, gives the analogy: 
 
Surely we all know that the human brain is poor at weighting and computing.  
When you check out at a supermarket, you don’t eyeball the heap of purchases 
and say to the clerk, “Well it looks to me as if it’s about $17.00 worth; what 
do you think?” The clerk adds it up (Meehl, 1986, p.372). 
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Just as the clerk does not hesitate to use an adding machine, the child protection 
worker should not be reluctant to use an actuarial method to calculate the overall 
weight of the various risk factors.   
 
However, the number obtained at the end of the calculation needs to be viewed with 
realistic caution.  Numbers have an air of authority and objectivity that can mislead 
people into crediting them with more accuracy than they deserve.  The aim of this 
article has not been to criticise the use of instruments but to caution against over-
confidence in their results. If the rate of true and false positives is understood, then 
clearly, the conclusion should be treated tentatively and practitioners should continue 
to keep an open mind about its accuracy.  The examples used in this article show how 
even an instrument with reasonably good sensitivity and specificity can produce large 
numbers of false positives and false negatives, depending on the base rate in the 
population in question.  An additional cautionary note is that the relevant statistics are 
not known for many instruments or, if available, are to some degree estimates rather 
than confident assertions. The formal probability calculation can be impressive and 
inspire confidence but the reader should remember that it is being used on imperfect 
statistics. 
 
Human beings seem to have a persistent yearning for certainty (Gigernenzer, 2002).  
Risk assessment instruments that make mathematical calculations based on the best 
empirical evidence may well be the best way of assessing the level of danger to a 
child but their conclusions carry no magical guarantee of truth.   Professionals need to 
know how to ask questions about the level of accuracy and to understand the 
implications the answers have in terms of ratios of true and false positives and true 
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and false negatives.  Agencies and the public need to accept that professional 
judgements and decisions, even when based on the best evidence and the best way of 
computing the evidence, are fallible.  On-going work with a family needs to be 
undertaken knowing that the current risk assessment is only a best estimate and may 
need to be revised in the light of new information. 
 
The shift to evidence-based practice represents a move from an appeal to authority or 
tradition to an appeal to evidence gained from empirical research (Gambrill, 2001).  
Unless practitioners have sufficient numeracy skills to assess the evidence 
themselves, there is a danger of replacing the authority of the clinical expert with a 
misguidedly exaggerated deference to the scientific expert.   
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Figures for ‘A simpler way to understand the results of risk assessment 
instruments’ 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Probability of a    = sensitivity x base rate
   True positive           probability of a positive result 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
P(a/t) = p(t/a) p(a)
            P(t) 
 
Tree diagram 1 
 
 
100 families 
 
   20 abusive   80 not abusive 
            
        18             2   16  64 
     Positive result   negative result      positive result   negative result 
 
 
Tree diagram 2 
 
10,000 men 
 
 
 
   150 infected   9,850 not infected 
            
 
   
        150             0   1  9,849 
     positive result   negative result      positive result   negative result 
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Tree diagram 3 
 
10,000 men 
 
 
 
   1 infected   9,999 not infected 
            
 
   
        1                         0   1    9,998 
     positive result   negative result      positive result   negative result 
 
 
 
Tree diagram 4 
 
1000 families 
 
 
 
   400 abusive   600 not abusive 
            
 
   
        276             124   156      444 
     positive result   negative result      positive result   negative result 
 
 
 
 
Tree diagram 5 
 
1000 families 
 
 
 
   4 abusive   996 not abusive 
            
 
   
        3                        1   259        737 
     positive result   negative result      positive result   negative result 
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